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In 2011, the German government launched its Industrie 4.0 initiative to 
“drive digital manufacturing forward by increasing digitization and the 
interconnection of products, value chains and business models” (EU, 
2017). The fourth industrial revolution has now become widely 
accepted as the era in which technologies like cyber-physical systems 
and cognitive computing will enable a significant increase in operational 
efficiency and productivity (Lu, 2017). Similar to the way in which 
automation with programmable logic controllers and robotics 
represented a third industrial revolution in the late 1970s, the fourth 
industrial revolution is expected to bring smarter manufacturing, 
products and services (ibid.). 
 
Key characteristics of Industry 4.0 are often found to be digitization, 
connectivity and interoperability (ibid.). This can be interpreted as if the 
fourth industrial revolution essentially marks the beginning of an 
interconnection of the physical and digital worlds (Guth et al., 2016). 
Digitization of our environment has arguably been an ongoing process 
for at least the better part of the past century. Much of these efforts 
can be attributed to our desire to describe the world in a language that 




These superior capabilities become prevalent with technologies like big 
data analysis, which can increase functionality and quality in products 
and services by revealing patterns and correlations that were previously 
invisible (Golchha, 2015). Big data is also a key source for machine 
learning which is the heart of artificial intelligence (Liang et al., 2018). 
Indeed, advanced data analytics has recently been found to be the most 
pursued approach to technology innovation, which is yet another 
indication of data itself becoming an indispensable asset (Ringel et al., 
2018). 
 
Although vast amounts of digital information are already being 
collected and processed, fundamental Industry 4.0 prerequisites such 
as connectivity and interoperability have been lagging behind due to 
cybersecurity concerns and technological incompatibility in industrial 
environments (Kim & Chang, 2014). 
 
The EU Commission supports the theory that interoperability is one of 
the major barriers to a successful digital economy (Kerber & Schweitzer, 
2017). Therefore, projects like BIG IoT have received funding from the 
EU Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program to develop common 
interfaces to overcome this technological barrier (Bröring et al., 2017). 
Moreover, much like digital convergence in the telecommunication and 
media industry was enabled by technological change and convergence 




information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) is now 
emerging (Murray, Johnstone, & Valli, 2017). The IT/OT convergence 
may also contribute to close the remaining technology gap in the 
Industry 4.0 vision. 
 
However, the levels of information transparency as envisioned for 
Industry 4.0 cannot be achieved through physical connections and 
technological compatibility alone. Multiple studies have assessed the 
economic grounds and associated incentives for sharing digital 
information in the form of sensor data. For instance, the Sensing as a 
Service (S2aaS) business model was anticipated by De Cristofaro, Ding 
and Tsudik (2009) as an internet-connected sensor network offering 
commercial data access services. This model has later been covered in 
great detail by Zaslavsky, Perera and Georgakopoulos (2013), who link 
the concept to the Internet of Things paradigm. Central to the S2aaS 
business model is the concept of IoT data marketplaces (Mišura & Žagar, 
2016). The key motivation behind such marketplaces is to create 
platforms on which raw data streams from different connected devices, 
which otherwise may remain unexploited or stored in silos, can be 
traded for increased value creation (Perera, 2017a). 
 
As consensus has yet to be reached on the exact definition of IoT 
devices, we will consider IoT as physical or virtual sensors capable of 




is inspired by Ashton (2009), who was the first to coin the IoT term in 
1999. Some scholars also include actuators under the IoT umbrella 
(Perera, 2017b), but we will limit our scope to only cover sensors as a 
part of the Sensing as a Service business model. 
 
The Internet of Things is one of the key frameworks supporting Industry 
4.0 (Khan et al., 2017). However, various definitions of IoT allow for 
many interpretations including personal devices and applications 
focusing on more user-centric convenience than significant gains in 
operational efficiency and productivity. Therefore, we will use the term 
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), which can be considered as a 
subcategory of IoT. Due to the lack of a widely accepted definition of 
IIoT, we will assign this term to what the EU Commission defines as 
machine-generated, non-personal raw data. The EU Commission 
describes such data as being “created without the direct intervention of 
a human by computer processes, applications or services, or by sensors 
processing information received from equipment, software or 
machinery, whether virtual or real” (Zech, 2017). Thus, we use the term 
“industrial” to emphasize the value propositions for various industries, 
although the actual data may be collected in non-industrial 
environments like in private, connected cars (Kerber & Frank, 2017). 
 
Thus, IIoT data may initially involve personal information originating 




optimization, asset tracking and monitoring, predictive maintenance 
and operational control systems (Lu, 2017). The EU General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) defines personal data as “any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”. A natural person 
is further defined as “one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identifier”. Therefore, with IIoT data, we 
have to assume that any initial personal data has been rendered non-
personal through sufficient anonymization. This means that we will not 
consider privacy concerns in this study. 
 
Prior research highlights many use-cases for data-driven applications 
across a wide range of industries and underlines the benefits in 
increased sharing of data as a non-rivalrous good (Lu, 2017; Marjani et 
al., 2017; Rafaeli & Raban, 2005). However, a recent communication by 
the EU Commission addressing ownership and access rights of non-
personal data, expresses concerns that current limitations in data 
sharing means that we are not taking full advantage of the emerging 
data-driven economy (Kerber, 2017). 
 
The EU communication has sparked a debate on the property rights of 
IIoT data as well as why privately held sensor data is not sufficiently 






1.2 Problem Description 
Improved data availability for service providers and developers can 
represent promising opportunities for machine learning in artificial 
intelligence-powered applications (Golchha, 2015) or to extend 
capabilities of existing products and services (Perera, 2017b). In 
addition, it is expected that academics and research institutions can 
benefit from broadened access to real-time data (Milham et al., 2017). 
In more detail, information harvested by IIoT devices can enable a wide 
range of smart applications within domains like utility metering, 
logistics, supply chains, agriculture, power grids, traffic and building 
controls (Marjani et al., 2017) as well as an overall increase in 
manufacturing efficiency (Lu, 2017). 
 
Despite these business opportunities, the limited presence of data 
sharing through (I)IoT data marketplaces is evident (Kerber, 2017). 
While economic articles such as the one by Kerber (2017) suggest that 
the main barrier to increased data sharing is the lack of knowledge on 
how data can be exploited, we believe the rapid increase in production 
and use of (I)IoT data suggests otherwise. In addition, the current 
presence of online (I)IoT data marketplaces featuring common 
interfaces indicates that technological incompatibilities have already 





Prior studies on S2aaS and (I)IoT data marketplaces pay little attention 
to fundamental prerequisites for any economic transaction, namely 
pricing, well-defined property rights and associated mechanisms to 
enforce them. On the other hand, the more economically oriented 
debate following the EU communication on data ownership does not 
seem to fully acknowledge the technological aspects of this issue. We 
believe the uncertainty and disagreements characterizing prior 
publications on this topic are caused by the lack of an interdisciplinary 
assessment in this domain. 
 
Although Kerber (2017) assumes that (I)IoT data streams can be 
classified as an excludable good, we argue that sustainable data sharing 
is actually inhibited by the current de facto non-excludable 
characteristics of IIoT data streams. This is not due to a lack of 
technological protection mechanisms, but because such techniques 
have yet to be incorporated in commercially viable digital rights 
management models for IIoT data. Thus, in the middle of the heated 
debate on who should be granted property rights to data, the critical 
function of enforcing these property rights seems to have been 
forgotten. No prior research has proposed a model for digital rights 
management that considers both the property rights enforcement and 






1.3 Research Objective and Question 
Based on these shortcomings, our research objective is to combine the 
related and sometimes even conflicting elements of pricing strategies 
and property rights enforcement in one digital rights management 
model for IIoT data, and we ask how this combination can contribute to 
economically viable IIoT data trading. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
This study encompasses the key economic and associated technological 
mechanisms involved with trading IIoT data. The assessment of prior 
literature considers supply and demand, property rights allocation and 
enforcement, and economic characteristics of IIoT data streams as a 
tradable good. 
 
Based on the findings of our literature review, we complete the 
following steps to answer our research question: 
 
1. Requirements and relevant scenarios for digital rights 
management of IIoT data streams are identified: 
o The need for watermarking of IIoT data streams as a 
measure of property rights enforcement is supported. 
o The need for versioning of IIoT data streams as a 




2. A watermarking technique is developed and combined with 
product versioning in a digital rights management model and 
used as basis for the economic analysis. 
3. The relationship between watermarking robustness and 
product versions is analytically analyzed by considering: 
i. Revenue maximization from versioning 
ii. Cost minimization of watermark recovery and 
authentication 
iii. Cost maximization of watermark attacks due to quality 
reduction 
4. Discussion of the results concludes the work. 
 
1.5 Contributions 
This study provides a novel approach to remedy the IIoT data sharing 
incentive problem by combining property rights enforcement and 
pricing strategy. 
 
The proposed model includes a simplistic watermarking mechanism for 
sensor data that features a strong relationship with IIoT data versioning. 
We also show how the so-called optimal quality gap can be quantified 
for property right holders to achieve profit maximization as an incentive 





This approach extends the scope of prior literature on S2aaS and IIoT 
data marketplaces like Zaslavsky, Perera and Georgakopoulos (2013); 
Sheng et al. (2013); Mišura and Žagar (2016); and Perera (2017a, 2017b). 
The academic motivation behind this study is to close the gap between 
the aforementioned technologically oriented works and the more 
recent economic articles concerning the EU communication on the 
property rights of IIoT data (Richter & Slowinski, 2019). 
 
1.6 Structure 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: a literature review 
on the S2aaS business model, IIoT data marketplaces and associated 
economic topics is presented in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we summarize 
the key takeaways from our literature review to support the proposed 
property rights enforcement and pricing model. We then introduce a 
digital watermarking technique as a core element for the proceeding 
economic analyses. In Chapter 4, we utilize our model in an analytical 
analysis to answer our research question. Chapter 5 summarizes our 
findings before potential shortcomings of the proposed model are 








2 Literature Review 
2.1 Sensing as a Service 
Sensing as a Service emerges from the recent servitization paradigm in 
information technology (Duan et al., 2015). Centralization and 
increased availability of computing power in combination with 
improved infrastructure have fostered a wide range of cloud-oriented 
ICT services. The most prevalent concepts are Infrastructure as a Service 
(IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS) 
(Perera et al., 2014). This servitization paradigm is sometimes 
summarized as Everything as a Service (XaaS) and is largely driven by 
scalability, accessibility, pay-per-use pricing models and dynamic 
resource allocation (ibid.). Thus, cloud computing can offer the benefits 
from low initial investments, economies of scale and high-end services 
all at once. 
 
More recent contributions to the cloud computing service family 
include Sensing as a Service (S2aaS). This is a subcategory of Data as a 
Service that is shaped by the rapidly expanding ecosystem of (I)IoT 
devices and platforms. The idea is that billions of (I)IoT devices can 
provide new insights for value-added services through a multilateral 
content distribution model (Koutroumpis, Leiponen, & Thomas, 2017; 





The novelty of Sensing as a Service is not necessarily in the provision of 
digital information. Such data markets have existed for some time 
(Muschalle et al., 2012). The distinction between S2aaS and other 
means of providing digital commodities as a service is mainly attributed 
to the raw and real-time properties of IIoT data streams (Mišura & Žagar, 
2016). In other words, the data marketplace we assess in this study 
facilitates exchange of data before value-added services like analytics, 
aggregation or combination of data have been provided. 
 
In a state-of-the-art literature review on economics and pricing models 
for (I)IoT, Luong et al. (2016) describe the general (I)IoT model shown in 
Figure 1. This model is also the basis of other comprehensive reviews in 
this domain like Yan, Zhang and Vasilakos (2014). The Sensing as a 
Service interface typically occurs between platform and data processing. 
In this way, providers of data analyses, applications and other services 






Figure 1 – The (I)IoT Model and Sensing as a Service 
 
Although a single data stream representing an unprocessed and simple 
physical factor may look worthless at first sight, the ability to sense the 
environment is allegedly an essential prerequisite for Industry 4.0 
technologies (Lu, 2017). When combining multiple IIoT data streams 
from the environment, a certain combination or collection may 
construct valuable information. Large collections of IIoT data can also 
be defined as big data, which is often characterized by its volume, 
velocity, variety, veracity and value (Jin et al., 2015). 
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2.2 Economic Characteristics of IIoT Data 
There are arguably two main approaches to value creation with IIoT 
data (Liang et al., 2018): as an intermediate good for the creation of 
new or enhanced products and services, or as a final information good 
to support decision-making and optimize existing processes. In this 
section we will focus on the latter case and the unique properties of 
digital information goods. 
 
In information economics, information itself obtains its value from the 
increase in expected payoff or utility from making informed decisions. 
This can be shown as (Lawrence, 2012):  
 
𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) 	= 	𝜋(𝑥, 𝑎+) 	− 	𝜋(𝑥, 𝑎-) 
 
where: 
π(x,a) is the profit function at state x with the decision a.  
ay is the decision made with information. 
a0 is the decision made without information.  
 
While some may be surprised to learn the quite recent appreciation of 
information in the form of raw sensor data as a valuable good, 
information economics and the power of knowledge in trading has long 
been appreciated by academics like Stigler (1961). More recently, we 




levels. One example of competitive advantage obtained from 
milliseconds is underlined by Lewis (2014), who explains how high-
frequency traders have made billion-dollar investments in 
infrastructure to reduce latency in communication with stock 
exchanges. This example highlights an important distinction that needs 
to be made between static and streaming data as a tradeable good. 
 
A common characteristic of information in general is that determining 
its price is quite different from pricing physical goods due to the 
negligible marginal cost of (re)production and low transactional costs. 
As Shapiro and Varian (1998) proclaimed, “information is costly to 
produce but cheap to reproduce”. In many cases it can also be argued 
that information is easy to create but hard to trust and easy to spread 
but hard to control, but disruptive technologies like blockchain and 
smart contracts for implementing provenance and excludability may 
challenge the two latter conceptions (Missier et al., 2017; Ølnes, Ubacht, 
& Janssen, 2017; Özyilmaz, Doğan, & Yurdakul, 2018). 
 
Open data markets for static data like the former Microsoft Azure 
DataMarket have been around for years. Associated market structures 
and especially pricing models have therefore been covered in great 
detail in studies such as Muschalle et al. (2012) and Tang et al. (2013). 
However, the economic differences between static and streamed data 




(2016) emphasize the importance of freshness as well as the fact that a 
data stream is normally sold before it has been collected. This means 
that the actual contents and thus the potential value of the data stream 
may for both parties be highly uncertain at the time it is traded. 
Moreover, the generic nature of sensor data and its many use-cases can 
make it challenging to reveal the highly diverse willingness to pay 
amongst various consumers. 
 
In general, information can be considered a hybrid of public and private 
goods (Rafaeli & Raban, 2005). It can be relatively non-excludable and 
non-rivalrous unless technological protection measures prove 
otherwise. Like a trade secret, a raw data stream could entail sufficient 
incentives for non-disclosure, but the idea of the open marketplace is 
to monetize data that may be of value to others and thus exploit gains 
from trade in the market model. From the perspective of overall welfare 
maximization, a non-rivalrous good with close to zero marginal cost in 
production should be shared with any potential stakeholder (Kerber, 
2017). However, this approach is not likely to be in the interest of a 
private owner nor considered a fair distribution for the ones investing 
in data acquisition. It is also important to keep in mind that although 
data and information itself is non-rivalrous, the consequences of 
sharing it may cause rivalrous actions if the information can be used to 





That said, a major challenge in marketplaces for goods with close to 
zero marginal cost of reproduction, negligible transaction costs and no 
means of absolute protection is the threat of arbitrage (Pantelis & Aija, 
2013). A contract preventing a buyer from reproducing and distributing 
the same data stream is critical to maintain the data producer’s 
economic incentive to collect and share data. Otherwise, a malicious 
buyer could exploit the arbitrage opportunity and resell the data to 
multiple buyers at a lower price than the original good. We will look 
more closely into this aspect in our review of property rights of data. 
 
Another characteristic of markets for information is that they are 
known to not exhibit high degrees of transparency, which means that 
the good needs to be partially revealed before it can be fully evaluated 
by the consumer. This is obviously not an ideal situation for a close to 
non-excludable good. However, the importance of freshness in IIoT 
data streams may allow samples to be a fairly efficient way of signaling 
quality according to the concept described by Spence (1978). 
 
Apart from sampling, Mišura, Krešimir and Žaga (2016) propose two-
way credibility ratings as found in other platforms like eBay and Uber 
for signaling the quality of a data stream, its provider or consumer. That 
said, Richter and Slowinski (2019) underline the need for more 




critical data than, for example, private consumers evaluating their 
driver in ride-hailing services like Uber.  
 
2.2.1 Property Rights of Data 
According to the Coase Theorem, given well-defined property rights and 
sufficiently low transaction and bargaining costs, an open market will 
lead to the most efficient and mutually beneficial outcome (Coase, 
1960). Thus, the main goal of the legal system is to assign these property 
rights and enforce contract law. This is however not always straight-
forward for digital goods. 
 
There are two general positions that can be taken when discussing data 
ownership. One side is driven by increased openness through wide 
contributions of data assigned to the public domain similar to the open-
source ideology. This can for instance be achieved through mandatory 
transparency from a regulatory point of view. The other side is seeking 
exclusive property rights and thus private incentives for data creation 
from profit maximization through the market solution. Due to our focus 
on the sustainability of the S2aaS business model, this study will focus 
on the latter position. 
 
The European Union has gained attention for driving discussions on 
data governance (Zech, 2017). In 1996, the Database Directive 




communication released in 2017 addresses ownership and access rights 
of non-personal data in relation to the European data economy (Zech, 
2017), and the GDPR gave EU residents the right of personal data 
portability in 2018 (De Hert et al., 2018). Therefore, we will approach 
the S2aaS business model from the perspective of the European Union, 
which seems to be taking the lead on data regulations. Although we will 
not pursue novel judicial interpretations of data ownership legislations 
in this chapter, we will highlight certain aspects of EU law and other 
scholars that are relevant to our research objective. 
 
The EU Copyright Directive is often cited in discussions on the property 
rights of intangible or digital goods. Therefore, we will first assess the 
applicability of copyright law and other means of absolute protection of 
non-personal raw data streams. The digital age has certainly challenged 
the enforcement of copyright law by enabling highly efficient 
reproduction, dissemination and storage of digital information (Peters, 
2006). As the main goal of copyright law is to stimulate creative activity, 
the challenge is to balance owners’ ability to trade and distribute the 
work digitally while also preventing infringers from doing the same 
(ibid.). 
 
At the European level, non-personal data may in general qualify for 
absolute protection under the law of copyright (EU, 2006), sui generis 




expressing literary or artistic works may obtain copyright protection (EU, 
2006). We consider such creative elements to be unlikely to occur in 
IIoT data as covered by this study. Moreover, the database right, which 
is an acquis of the copyright law, applies to databases that “by reason 
of the selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author's 
own intellectual creation” (EU, 1996). However, copyright protection 
does not extend to the actual contents of such databases (EU, 1996). 
Hence, data streams from IIoT devices cannot be individually protected 
under copyright nor database right law. Lastly, trade secrets must have 
commercial value and be subject to measures aimed at keeping them 
secret in order to be protected under EU law (EU, 2016). As the S2aaS 
business model implies making IIoT data streams available on a 
marketplace, we consider trade secret protection to also be irrelevant 
for this purpose. 
 
Therefore, if legally binding property rights are to be obtained for non-
personal IIoT data streams, protection must in most cases be sought 
through general civil law concepts like contract law. This conclusion is 
in line with prior assessments of data provenance by Koutroumpis, 
Leiponen and Thomas (2017) as well as a legal analysis on exclusive 
rights of data by Wiebe (2016). 
 
Legally binding contracts, which in the EU are based on the Principles of 




agreement reserving certain rights of the information being exchanged. 
A contract may represent an adequate solution in certain use cases but 
poses some obvious shortcomings when compared to automatically 
granted protection like copyright. For instance, a contract must first 
fulfill the basic requirements of legal enforceability which involves 
obtaining acceptance by all parties. This could in some cases require the 
traded information to be revealed before the contract is legally binding 
due to low level of transparency of digital assets. Moreover, the 
doctrine of privity of contract is another common principle 
differentiating contract law from copyright law in an unfavorable way 
for data owners. Privity means that the rights or obligations of a 
contract are only binding to the parties signing the contract. This implies 
that contract law would normally not prevent a third party from 
redistributing a data stream against the will of the original creator. 
 
The lack of absolute protection of IIoT data from non-personal sensors 
is in line with the general consensus of factual information not being 
copyrightable. Despite the challenges this may introduce for IIoT data 
owners, the principle is arguably still reasonable as the converse would 
naturally pose a major hindrance to most activities in science, media, 
culture and more. However, in a commission staff working document 
on the free flow of data and emerging issues of the European data 
economy, the EU has proposed a data producer’s right where the 




operate sensor-equipped machines, tools or devices at their own 
economic risk” would be granted the property right for machine-
generated, non-personal raw data (Zech, 2017). 
 
In an economic article discussing the above-mentioned EU 
communication, Kerber (2017) summarizes the intentions of the EU 
Commission as facilitating increased data creation and sharing through 
reduced transaction costs for trading and licensing. The plan is to 
achieve this by establishing the producer’s right as well as what may 
become a mandatory access right to what we in this study define as IIoT 
data. However, Kerber (2017) argues that it is not necessary with a 
producer’s right because the situation would be no different from 
today’s solution where a party will have de facto rights to data. Property 
rights can still be licensed out with a contract regardless of any exclusive 
rights. Kerber (2017) emphasizes that this is only the case if the data is 
in fact excludable through proper technological measures, which is a 
disputed matter as argued in this study. 
 
On the other hand, Kerber (2017) is more positive to the proposed 
mandatory data access right because it may relieve the monopolistic 
control and unequal bargaining power that exclusive or de facto 
property rights are likely to cause. For instance, non-rivalrous, privately 
held data could be accessed in the public interest. Also, certain 




stakeholder situations such as the example of connected cars which we 
will return to later. Nevertheless, regulations such as the producer’s 
right could, if enacted, answer a relevant question of data ownership in 
industrial scenarios where machine suppliers collect data from their 
products to provide additional services to its users or in other ways 
monetize such data. 
 
Although the proposed producer’s right is initially exclusive, it is so as 
codified information – that is, not on the semantic level. The EU 
Commission is thus still within the principles behind non-copyrightable 
factual information. However, a recurring question in copyright 
disputes is the level of commonality between original works and 
infringing copies. Such uncertainties could therefore also arise with data 
streams protected under a producer’s right, which is likely to introduce 
many peculiar claims; for instance, how many similarities must an 
allegedly replicated data stream share with the original stream for it to 
infringe the producer’s right? That said, only a limited number of studies 
have been conducted in this domain and future research should explore 
consequences of a data producer’s right in more detail (Kerber & Frank, 
2017). 
 
2.2.2 Licensing of IIoT Data 
As we have seen, distributed digital content can be regulated by law 




granted rights of use are normally described in a product license. Such 
license terms are often incorporated as a semantic component of a 
Digital Rights Management system, called Rights Expression Languages 
(Nadah, de Rosnay, & Bachimont, 2007). 
 
From the perspective of IIoT data and other use-cases where the final 
product is likely to be composed of data from heterogeneously 
distributed sources, a challenge arises when composite licenses 
compliant with all their sub-licenses are to be described. A typical 
example of this is when a digital product is a result of multiple data 
streams from different sources. This is known as the license attribution 
stacking problem. In this regard, Governatori et al. (2013) have 
proposed an automated framework for composing such licenses based 
on deontic logic. Standardized licensing terms that are machine-
readable also facilitate automated trading in marketplaces for digital 
goods. 
 
According to an online catalog for data and analysis, www.data.world, 
these are the common license types for published data sets: public 
domain, attribution, share-alike, non-commercial, database only, and 
no derivates. Data is dedicated to the public domain by waving all rights 
to the extent allowed by law. An attribution license means that one 
must give credit to the creator and indicate if any changes have been 




transformation or derivate works under the same license as the original 
work. A non-commercial license requires the user to not exploit the 
contents for commercial purposes. ‘Database only’ specifies that the 
license only applies to the database and not the contents, and ‘no 
derivates’ prevents any work being derived from the contents. Non-
profit organizations such as Creative Commons have released copyright 
license models to the public in order to simplify the legal aspects related 
to reserving and waiving copyrights. The final license is often a 
combination of the above-mentioned types, such as Attribution-Non-
Commercial. 
 
In this study, we will consider the profit maximization approach to data 
sharing through the IIoT data marketplace, and we will therefore not 
consider open data nor other works assigned to the public domain. 
 
2.3 IIoT Data Marketplaces 
Open marketplace platforms for IIoT data have been proposed to 
increase utilization of the vast amounts of collected data across 
different industries and is believed to serve as a core function in the 
S2aaS business model (Mišura & Žagar, 2016). However, the concept is 






The purpose of IIoT data marketplaces is to match buyers and sellers 
and to facilitate the exchange of a digital good technologically, 
financially and formally. Given a critical mass of participants, a platform 
for data exchange is expected to reduce the transaction costs for both 
parties involved in the trade. This includes the search and information 
costs, bargaining costs and enforcement costs (Richter & Slowinski, 
2019). Based on the works by Mišura and Žagar (2016) and Parera 
(2017a and b), we have composed a proposed model of possible 
interactions between agents in IIoT data marketplaces in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Potential interactions in IIoT data marketplaces 
 
Data owners are the economic agents who have obtained the property 
rights of the data stream. As we have learned so far, these property 
rights are not necessarily well-defined. The data owner can connect any 
data source in its possession directly to an IIoT data marketplace 
platform given sufficient compatibility and ease of use. However, in the 
case where a sensor is not already in place, so-called senser agents may 
Platform 1 Platform 2 Platform n 
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offer their services in the form of sensor hardware and platform 
integration installed on the data owner’s property or assets. A publisher 
is an agent who is specializing in integration of existing sensor 
applications to IIoT data marketplaces. This agent is typically enabling 
interoperability through development of custom APIs. The platform 
agents are hosting IIoT data marketplaces and may create strategic 
alliances and share their data offerings. 
 
In more detail, the marketplace platform can take on responsibilities 
such as data validation, classification, combination, aggregation, 
transaction history and payments (Koutroumpis, Leiponen, & Thomas, 
2017). Due to the potential volume and variety of data, other important 
tasks for a marketplace platform is syntactic and semantic vocabulary 
management and indexing to allow for search-based discovery of data 
streams (Bröring et al., 2017). That said, the core functionality may turn 
out to be the creation of trust through reduction of information 
asymmetry as this is believed to represent a fundamental precondition 
for sharing data (Richter & Slowinski, 2019). 
 
On the consumer side, we have service providers utilizing the great 
variety of data streams to enhance their existing services or to develop 
new ones. These services are subsequently consumed by end-users, but 
some end-users may also consume raw data streams from the 




from clients’ cars (Kerber & Frank, 2017). In other words, there are both 
direct and indirect consumers of IIoT data streams. 
 
Despite the promising future of the S2aaS business model and the 
apparent presence of relevant technology, the current IIoT data 
marketplaces still seem to be in their infancy (Kerber, 2017; Richter & 
Slowinski, 2019). A search for active and open marketplaces currently 
promoting sales of (I)IoT or real-time data underlines the early stages of 
this business model. All (I)IoT data marketplaces discovered in this study 
were launched in 2018 and half of the platforms are emphasizing the 
fact that the platform is still under development. Nonetheless, these 
marketplaces address what has previously been found to be a lack of 
providers of dynamic data sources (Liang et al., 2018). 
 
The marketplaces listed in Table 1 were discovered by investigating the 
top 100 Google search results for keywords “iot data marketplace”, 
“sensing as a service marketplace”, “data stream marketplace”, “real-
time data marketplace” and “buy and sell iot data”. The search was 
performed in April 2019 with Private Browsing activated in Safari on 
macOS Mojave from South Korea. Industry-specific platforms as well as 







Table 1 – Current (I)IoT data marketplaces 
Name URL Status Launched 
IOTA Data Marketplace data.iota.org Operational (PoC) 2018 
Terbine terbine.io Operational (Beta) 2018 
databroker dao databrokerdao.com Operational 2018 
SynchroniCity  iot-data-marketplace.com Operational (Piloting) 2018 
Streamr streamr.com Operational 2018 
 
A noteworthy observation from this insight is that most marketplaces 
offer data that is already assigned to the public domain or that 
otherwise features public characteristics. Such data streams are 
typically representing weather data, traffic conditions, public 
transportation and environmental data such as air pollution and water 
quality. Hence, the absence of privately held data is prominent. 
Moreover, three of the discovered marketplaces utilize a 
cryptocurrency as a medium of exchange and distributed ledgers for 
transaction records. 
 
Another notable project that is currently under development is BIG IoT 
which attempts to facilitate (I)IoT platform integration through a 
common interface and data sharing in a marketplace. BIG IoT aims to 
overcome the technological barriers to interoperability and unified data 
management across (I)IoT platforms, ecosystems and other data 






2.3.1 Use-cases and Value Propositions 
In an outlook on the value and pricing of big data, Pantelis and Aija 
(2013) argue that the decisive factors for exchanging data are quality, 
price and consumers’ willingness to pay – just like with most other 
intangible goods. However, in addition to featuring negligible marginal 
cost of production, (I)IoT data is in many cases a byproduct of another 
process (Pantelis & Aija, 2013). Thus, there are few fixed costs to 
consider for data producers in IIoT data markets except from any 
opportunity costs associated with not sharing the data. We will now 
shift our attention to value propositions from IIoT data sharing and take 
a closer look at specific use-cases and associated data sources. 
 
Smart devices often include a wide range of sensors to feed control 
systems with close to real-time information that enables the more 
intelligent functionality. Machines, products and their users primarily 
trigger data collection for operational purposes, but this data can also 
have a secondary value, as we will see in this section.  
 
For further insights on this topic, we will use a connected car as an 
example. A modern car is equipped with advanced sensors feeding 
information to internal controls like advanced driver assistance systems 
as well as the driver itself (Kerber & Frank, 2017). The collected data can 
contain information on driving behavior, location and navigation, the 




in line with the motivation behind S2aaS and IIoT data marketplaces, 
connected cars can also share this data with third parties. Such 
stakeholders may be car manufacturers, owners, component suppliers, 
repair service providers, the government, insurance companies, other 
financial institutions and more (ibid.). 
 
The imagined use-cases for data harvested from connected cars are 
many. Some examples are performance analysis, predictive 
maintenance, auto part supply chain optimization, emergency 
assistance, traffic monitoring, road condition alerts, road quality 
reporting, tailor-made insurance pricing, weather forecasting and 
various smart city applications. A more novel use-case is the collection 
of data for training neural networks for autonomous vehicles as 
presented by Tesla Motors. 
 
As explained by Liang et al. (2018), IIoT data streams can be reutilized 
for either more informed decision-making or the development of new 
or enhanced technology. The above-mentioned use-cases are spread 
across both categories. Liang et al. (2018) also cite several studies 
showing how commercial value is created from related use-cases. Thus, 






Although this study will not assess current policy evaluations regarding 
who should be entitled to the ownership of IIoT data, it is worth 
mentioning that the connected car example is a central scenario in the 
EU commission’s discussions on this topic (Kerber & Frank, 2017). The 
debatable question in that regard is for instance whether the car 
manufacturer or car owner should be granted exclusive property rights, 
and whether any other parties should be granted default access rights 
for the greater good. Considering that there might be multiple 
stakeholders involved in both the collection and utilization of data 
streams, the associated market scenarios could pose complex data 
governance issues (Kerber & Frank, 2017). 
 
Kerber and Frank (2017) also emphasize that the ideal outcome of the 
connected car scenario is strongly affected by how the data is made 
available – that is, if the car is connected to a marketplace platform, to 
the manufacturer’s ecosystem or accessible as a source for multiple 
stakeholders. This discussion is closely related to the treatment of 
personal data, but according to the scope of this study we will ignore 
this fact and assume that all data has been sufficiently anonymized. 
 
For instance, the car manufacturer may have obvious interests in 
utilizing car data in its service provision and product development, 
reselling it to other service providers for additional revenue streams, or 




2017). Property rights of this data are typically obtained through a 
contract between the car owner and manufacturer to clear up any legal 
uncertainties, but many car manufacturers are today in de facto control 
of the data due to technological barriers (Kerber, 2017). In future IIoT 
applications, it is envisioned that consumers are explicitly awarded for 
giving up data. For instance, car owners may expect access to free or 
improved services, or other financial benefits, as proposed by Perera 
(2017a), if they choose to share certain data streams. 
 
The open market solution implies that it is the agent being able to 
create the most value who will eventually obtain control of the data 
regardless of how property rights are initially distributed (Kerber & 
Frank, 2017). Although the car manufacturer may technically or 
contractually prevent the car connecting to an open marketplace, the 
manufacturers that choose to limit such access would in theory only be 
better off if that is the most effective solution overall. Otherwise, they 
may eventually not sell any cars. This is, however, a theoretical scenario 
that is not very likely unless car buyers are perfectly rational, all cars 
have perfect substitutes and all agents have perfect information.  
 
That said, Kerber (2017) argues that producer’s rights as proposed by 
the EU Commission would not remedy market failures because the 
rights are likely to be bargained away in contracts. Thus, unequal 




competition and innovation through hold-up problems and 
monopolistic behavior. 
 
2.3.2 Market Structures and Pricing Models 
Although IIoT data streams have many theoretical use cases and 
potential value propositions, we must turn to prior research to 
investigate how and in which market structures IIoT data streams can 
be part of commercially viable business models. 
 
In terms of assigning value to data, Fricker and Maksimov (2017) 
reviewed studies on pricing mechanisms for both static and streamed 
data and concluded that there is actually no consolidated 
understanding of how such data products can be priced. Not all 
reviewed studies considered the open marketplace approach, but 
interestingly, they were all assuming market structures characterized by 
monopoly, duopoly or monopsony. Moreover, pricing models surveyed 
by Fricker and Maksimov (2017) had different aims and varied from 
profit to social welfare maximization as well as internal consistency and 
fairness – where internal consistency means that the pricing function is 
monotonic, and fairness suggests that there is a fair trade-off between 
price and quality. In terms of pricing attributes, usage, quality, cost, 






As emphasized by many scholars, IIoT data streams can construct big 
data and can thus be utilized for associated analyses. Therefore, we 
include the assessment by Pantelis and Aija (2013) on value and pricing 
of big data in the case of online marketplaces for reference. Pantelis and 
Aija (2013) apply the mode of data ownership to categorize data from 
an economic perspective. The authors argue that in a market with open 
or public data, which would suggest strong competition due to the 
nearly free availability of such data, neoclassical economic theory 
suggests that the price will be approaching marginal cost of production. 
In the case of digital information, we know that marginal cost of 
(re)production is close to zero. Hence, data markets with open or public 
data are unlikely to be sustainable (ibid.). Therefore, only privately held, 
digital goods with a certain degree of differentiation are expected to be 
commercially viable in an open marketplace. Pantelis and Aija (2013) 
classify such goods as being mainly private with well-defined and 
exclusive property rights. In the case of a sustainable market scenario 
with monopolistic power through data differentiation, Pantelis and Aija 
(2013) underline that profit maximization is reached through price 
discrimination with mechanisms such as versioning, market 
segmentation and personalized pricing. 
 
In a more recent study on data trading, Liang et al. (2018) assessed the 
full lifecycle of data trading through a comprehensive literature review. 




of data due to the vast amount of use-cases. Thus, the theory of 
screening will be important as the seller is likely to suffer from imperfect 
information because the data application is unknown (Stiglitz, 1975).  
 
As for pricing strategies in data markets, Liang et al. (2018) found that 
data packages, pay-per-use, flat rate, dynamic, two-part tariff and 
freemium models are all relevant. Liang et al. (2018) separate pricing 
models into three different categories: economic-based pricing, game 
theory-based pricing and auctioning. The first category contains typical 
variants of models like cost-based and consumer perceived value-based 
pricing, while the second category includes models like non-cooperative, 
Stackelberg and Bargaining games. Relevant auction models are 
forward and reverse one-sided, double, sealed-bid and combinatorial 
auctions. However, the authors emphasize that it is eventually the 
market structure that will have the greatest influence on price 
determination. Liang et al. (2018) also found that common techniques 
for price differentiation of data is versioning through different levels of 
precision and frequency. 
 
2.4 Digital Rights Management for IIoT 
The volatility, regulatory uncertainty and unique economic 
characteristics surrounding IIoT data streams raise a need for suitable 
protection mechanisms with respect to obtaining provenance and 




the importance of digital rights management to prevent digital goods 
from being copied, shared and stolen (Liang et al., 2018). This chapter 
will provide insight into prior works on technological protection 
mechanisms for data streams. 
 
Central techniques in digital rights management are encryption, 
watermarks and digital signatures. The portability and reproducibility of 
digital goods make these measures essential to provide security, access 
control, usage control, license management and payment fulfillment 
(Liang et al., 2018). In their literature review on this topic, Liang et al. 
(2018) categorized digital rights management into three types: 
software-based, where unauthorized use is typically prevented with 
encryption and user authentication; multimedia-based, where 
encryption and watermarking are designed to prevent malicious 
reproduction; and unstructured data-based management, which is 
what applies in the context of IIoT data streams (Panah et al., 2016). 
 
As explained by Liang et al. (2018), digital rights management of 
unstructured data is considered to be more challenging than for 
software and multimedia because replication and tampering is 
technically difficult to control. This is because data streams function as 
carriers of information without a pre-defined application, which makes 
fulfillment of licensing terms rely heavily on trust and moral obligations. 




user authentication for access control, the information contained in the 
data stream must eventually be revealed to the consumer, which in turn 
enables virtually effortless reproduction. This is a clear distinction from 
digital media files carrying images, music and video where the 
perceived value is largely driven by its analogue consumption by 
humans. 
 
Digital watermarks are often implemented to enforce copyrights of 
digital media (Cox et al., 2002). For instance, invisible watermarks can 
be implemented in audio files at frequencies outside the human hearing 
range, or in middle-frequency parts of images through techniques even 
sustaining various forms of processing and cropping (Hsu & Wu, 1999). 
Such watermarks can, for example, contain information about the 
original buyer. If this fingerprint is carried with any illicit copy of the 
original work, the malicious agent behind the breach of contract bears 
a significant risk of being revealed due to the embedded traceability. 
Thus, digital watermarks can serve as an effective barrier to illegal 
reproduction and redistribution of digital works (Chen & Wornell, 2001). 
 
However, unlike images and audio files, digital watermarks in IIoT data 
streams would necessarily impose a notable difference in the good. A 
single number can simply not hold more information than its intrinsic 
numerical value unless the value itself or its metadata is altered. The 




streams can thus be attributed to the fact that we do not necessarily 
know the actual use-case or mode of consumption for the latter good. 
This is why IIoT data streams need to be offered in an open and generic 
format. In other words, if we did not know that music was to be 
consumed by human ears, we may not have implemented watermarks 
at frequencies outside the human hearing range. 
 
In a review of state-of-the-art techniques for digital watermarking, 
Panah et al. (2016) summarize five popular methods: low-bit encoding, 
spread spectrum, statistical watermarking, angle coding, and dither 
modulation. Low-bit encoding techniques like alternation of the least 
significant bit (LSB) are both simple and common, but often vulnerable 
to manipulations. In spread spectrum watermarking, information is 
spread across multiple data samples to better withstand detection and 
removal. Statistical watermarking embeds information by modifying 
the statistical characteristics of data. Angle coding is often of complex 
form and encodes information within the angle between variables. 
Lastly, dither modulation is the class on which we will focus in this study 
due to its applicability on data streams. This class contains methods like 
Quantization Index Modulation (Chen & Wornell, 2001) and applies 
perturbation over multiple data points to embed a watermark. 
 
All digital watermarking techniques face a trade-off between three 




distortion of the original data, and maximizing the robustness against 
attacks (ibid.). This is in line with the key properties of digital 
watermarks: invisibility, capacity, robustness, and security (Panah et al., 
2016). The two latter properties are sometimes used interchangeably. 
Cox et al. (2002) assign the security property to the ability to withstand 
intentional attempts to prevent watermark detection, while robustness 
covers the ability to survive more innocent operations that may still 
compromise the watermark. We will use the term robustness to 
describe both of these properties. When considering robustness in 
designing digital watermarking techniques, it is common to design 
based on either security through obscurity or Kerckhoff’s principle from 
cryptography, which assumes that the encryption technology or 
technique is known, but not the secret key (Panah et al., 2016). 
 
Attacks against digital watermarking can be classified into four main 
categories (Voloshynovskiy et al., 2001): removal attacks, where 
information is sufficiently damaged; geometric attacks, targeting the 
watermark detection mechanism; cryptographic attacks, where the 
watermark is decoded and then removed or distorted; and protocol 
attacks, aiming to alter the watermark information.  
 
In terms of watermarking theory and its classification of data types, the 
IIoT data streams we are assessing in this study are classified as non-




al. (2016) underline that the unstructured characteristics of IIoT data 
streams imply that, for example, relational database watermarking 
techniques are not necessarily applicable. So-called non-media 
watermarking is a relatively new sub-domain of watermarking and 
limited studies have been conducted on this topic (Panah et al., 2016). 
That said, there are more use-cases for watermarking of data generated 
by sensor networks than we cover in the scope of this study. Some 
examples are in-network data aggregation and secure query processing, 
but these applications are mostly relevant before data is made available 
on a marketplace. 
 
For the purpose of implementing provenance in IIoT data, which is the 
history of data ownership that is central to the watermarking needs 
expressed in this study, Panah et al. (2016) highlight two main 
approaches: embedding through alteration of less significant bits in 
data samples, or in variable time delays between data samples. 
However, the latter technique is arguably not an ideal approach 
because time stamps may in many cases express critical information 
that should not be modified (ibid.). Therefore, we will focus on bit 
alteration instead of data point or time stamp alteration in this study. 
This is based on an assumption that time stamp reliability is considered 





Sion, Atallah and Prabhaka (2006) were reputedly the first to propose a 
technique for watermarking sensor data streams for the purpose of 
embedding provenance. As a basis for their work, the authors assumed 
that if value is found in a data stream, it is likely to be tied to the order 
and accuracy of the data points. Thus, watermarking techniques for 
data streams should not alter this information in any significant manner. 
Their study was motivated by the potential threat of malicious agents 
reselling data streams in secondary markets. The authors also 
emphasize the unfortunate feature of sensor data in that, despite its 
scientific usefulness, the provenance is easily disconnected from its 
content. Sion, Atallah and Prabhaka (2006) developed a technique that 
implements watermarks through alteration of more significant bits in 
selected extremes of the data stream. This method proved resilience to 
transforms such as sampling, summarization, random alterations, and 
combined transforms. 
 
Chong, Skalka and Vaughan (2010) were the first to propose a self-
identifying watermarking technique which utilizes check bits as 
metadata encoded into insignificant bits of data points, while the actual 
provenance marks are encoded into more significant bits. This approach 
achieves some degree of redundancy and shows better robustness to 
truncation and rounding. This study was the first to show encoding of 




integers, decimal numbers and low-entropy datasets (Panah et al., 
2016). 
 
Except from interpacket delay-based methods as designed by Sultana, 
Shehab and Bertino (2012), and sequence altering methods as designed 
by Xiao et al. (2010), forward reference searches with Google Scholar 
from the original works of Sion, Atallah and Prabhaka (2006) and Chong, 
Skalka and Vaughan (2010) do not reveal any novel bit altering- or 
quantization-based techniques designed for IIoT data streams except 
for those covered in this review. Table 2 summarizes the main IIoT data 
stream watermarking techniques we have identified and their potential 
shortcomings with respect to the scope of this study. 
 
Table 2 – Main watermarking techniques for IIoT data 
Method Weakness Reference 
LSB embedding in 
selected extremes. 
Limited generality and invisibility. Sion, Atallah and Prabhaka (2006) 
Metadata and LSB 
embedding. 
Insignificant bits can be attacked 
with limited loss of value. 
Chong, Skalka and Vaughan (2010) 
Data point sequence 
alternation. 
The sequence of data points is 
considered to be critical for many 
applications. 
Xiao et al. (2010) 
Variable interpacket 
delay. 
Interpacket delays are considered to 
be critical for many applications and 
are often fixed. 






In this chapter, we develop the basis of a digital rights management 
model for IIoT data streams in order to assess our research objective. 
The digital rights management model will consist of a mechanism for 
property rights enforcement in combination with a sustainable pricing 
scheme for IIoT data. 
 
IIoT data streams are, in general, not protected by copyright, and 
property rights must therefore be sought through contract law. Unless 
a data stream can be traced back to the initial buyer, only moral 
obligations would prevent buyers from breaching the contract that we 
assume disallows redistribution of data. Moreover, the barrier for 
malicious agents is weakened by the negligible marginal cost of 
(re)production of IIoT data streams. And, to make the matter worse, 
buyers in secondary markets are unlikely to be legally pursued for illicit 
redistribution due to privity of contract, which will add to the 
competition in secondary markets and make the price of the data 
stream approach its negligible marginal cost of (re)production. 
 
Therefore, the property rights enforcement method will be designed to 
implement traceability in data streams to the point where contract 






We have seen in our literature review that IIoT data streams are 
vulnerable to arbitrage due to the challenges involved in enforcing 
property rights (Mišura & Žagar, 2016). This effect is assumed to harm 
the data owner and will therefore act as a barrier to data sharing. We 
will not consider the specific license model in use, but we assume the 
data is privately held, and that the original owner seeks profit 
maximization by maintaining its monopolistic power in an IIoT data 
marketplace. This means that the owner has an interest in preventing 
buyers from reproducing and distributing the data stream in secondary 
markets unless those buyers are authorized to do so. 
 
The IIoT data covered by the scope of this study is machine-generated, 
non-personal data consisting of time-stamped real numbers. An 
example of such a data stream can be the speed of a connected car, 
which is part of core functionality needed to safely operate the vehicle 
in addition to being of potential interest to others. For instance, 
developers of autonomous driving systems may utilize this information 
in combination with other variables in their software development. On 
the other hand, the same data stream can also be valuable to insurance 
companies in case of an accident or for personalized pricing schemes 
based on driving behavior. However, it is natural to assume that the 
insurance company prefers a lower level of precision compared to the 




through product versioning. Another aspect of this multi-stakeholder 
scenario is that the perceived value of the data stream will increase if it 
can be authenticated – that is, a mechanism where the originality of the 
data stream can be confirmed through its watermark. 
 
We will therefore utilize so-called quality discrimination by applying 
versioning of the data stream as a measure to maximize profit as 
supported by prior literature (Liang et al., 2018). Regarding the 
perceived value of the data stream, we will assume that utility is 
expressed as a linear function of quality. And because use-cases of the 
same data stream may vary between different stakeholders as well as 
often not being known to the seller, we generalize quality to be 
described as the precision of the data stream. Hence, the perceived 
value of a data stream can be expressed as a linear function of the 
number of digits precision per data point in the stream. The precision 
level is the only factor of quality considered due to the potential 
elimination of certain use-cases caused by interpacket delay-based 
watermarking or the complete removal of certain data points. 
Therefore, we also assume that any attacks on watermarks attempt to 
maintain as much as possible of the original data stream and thus its 
quality and value. 
 
As we only consider non-personal, machine-generated sensor data in 




operating a product or process, and that there are only marginal 
additional costs, which are negligible, involved with producing or 
making the data available for sale – except for costs associated with 
enforcing property rights. In other words, the profit maximizing 
objective is aligned with revenue maximization. 
 
3.2 Watermarking Technique 
To embed provenance in IIoT data streams, we apply a digital 
watermarking technique based on alternation of less significant digits. 
Based on the review by Panah et al. (2016), we argue that this is the 
most relevant technological protection measure for this purpose. 
However, as opposed to prior works by Sion, Atallah and Prabhaka 
(2006) and Chong, Skalka and Vaughan (2010), we put additional 
emphasis on simplicity and the ability for the watermarking technique 
to provide product versioning and thus support associated pricing 
models. These requirements are motivated by our line of argument that 
there is a need for viable property rights enforcement and pricing 
models to facilitate increased IIoT data sharing. In addition, the 
technique is designed with respect to achieving the three main goals of 
digital watermarking: maximizing rate of information imbedding; 
minimizing distortion of the original data; and maximizing the 
robustness against attacks (Chen & Wornell, 2001). The watermarking 
principles applied in this study are inspired by the concepts of 





We propose a watermarking technique based on rounding operations. 
Rounding operations are normally applied with the purpose of 
approximating a fractional decimal number by a number with fewer 
digits but can also be applied to reduce the accuracy of integers. In 
computer science, this operation may typically be applied when 
compressing a data stream from double-precision (64-bit) to single-
precision (32-bit). However, in our model, rounding can also be utilized 
for both watermarking and for reducing precision for the purpose of 
product versioning. 
 
Tie-breaking rules are needed when rounding a decimal or digit that is 
exactly halfway between preceding integers. That is, if 9.5 should be 
rounded to 9 or 10. If it was not for fractions equal to 0.5, all round-off 
errors would be symmetric by always rounding to the nearest integer. 
The default rounding mode in the technical standard for floating-point 
arithmetic IEEE 754 is “round half to even”. This means that a midway 
floating point will be rounded to the nearest even integer value. In other 
words, 9.5 is rounded to 10 and 8.5 is rounded to 8. This method has no 
positive/negative bias and no bias toward/away from zero and will 
minimize the sum of expected errors. A similar tie-break rounding 
convention is “round half to odd”. As with “round half to even”, this rule 
also features the absence of positive/negative bias and bias 




The proposed watermarking technique is named Deterministic 
Alternation Between Integer Tie-breaks (DABIT). DABIT implements a 
seemingly invisible repeating watermark in IIoT data streams consisting 
of any real number with or without fractions consisting of two or more 
digits. The method works by altering between “round half to even” and 
“round half to odd” operations according to a predefined sequence for 
every encountered tie-break. The embedded watermark can, for 
example, represent a 64-bit binary code identifying the initial buyer of 
the data stream. A “round half to even” tie-break operation expresses 
a binary 1, and a “round half to odd” operation expresses a binary 0. In 
this way, DABIT enables close to non-biased watermarking of data 
streams with a negligible loss of precision and accuracy. By comparing 
a DABIT-encoded data stream with the unwatermarked time series, 
every case of a tie-break rounding will express a piece of the watermark. 
Thus, the full data stream does not necessarily need to be kept as 
reference. The watermark embedding sequence is conceptualized as a 
Python function in Figure 3, in which the precision of each data point of 






Figure 3 – Generic example of the watermarking process 
 
Note: Python’s built-in round() function uses the default rule “round 
half to even” in accordance with IEEE 754. Thus, round(x[t]) gives the 
same result as the custom function RoundHalfToEven(x[t]), but the 
latter is used for clarity in the watermark embedding process. 
 
3.2.2 Example 
Table 3 illustrates how an example of the first four bits (1001) of a 
repeating 64-bit watermark can be embedded in combination with 
product versioning. The Value column contains the original, 




left-most column. For every new pricing tier and thus quality level, the 
precision of each data point is reduced by one digit. In every instance 
where the reduction in precision involves a tie-break rounding 
operation, “round half to even” and “round half to odd” are used 
deterministically according to the bit sequence of the predefined 
watermark. When the bit to embed is 1, “round half to even” is applied 
and vice versa. 
 
Table 3 – Example of watermarking of an IIoT data stream 
Time Value Tier 1 DABIT Tier 2 DABIT Tier 3 DABIT Tier 4 DABIT 
t 43.846 43.85 - 43.8 1 44 - 40 - 
t+1 43.525 43.52 1 43.5 - 44 1 40 - 
t+2 42.947 42.95 - 42.9 0 43 - 40 - 
t+3 42.493 42.49 - 42.5 - 43 0 40 - 
t+4 43.065 43.07 0 43.1 - 43 - 40 - 
t+5 43.715 43.71 0 43.7 - 44 - 40 - 
t+6 44.150 44.15 - 44.1 0 44 - 40 - 
t+7 44.519 44.52 - 44.5 - 45 0 40 1 
t+8 44.655 44.66 1 44.7 - 45 - 50 0 
t+9 45.152 45.15 - 45.2 1 45 - 50 0 
t+10 45.301 45.30 - 45.3 - 45 - 40 1 
t+11 45.527 45.53 - 45.5 - 46 1 50 - 
 
In this way, the watermark will only be visible to the party having access 
to two adjacent data streams for comparison. 
 
3.2.3 Robustness 
In this chapter, we will discuss the robustness of DABIT against potential 




we find relevant for IIoT data streams. Although a wide range of 
sophisticated attacks are possible, we do emphasize our assumptions of 
value being associated with the quality of the data stream. Therefore, 
any attacks reducing the accuracy or removing proof of authenticity are 
expected to drastically reduce the value of the data stream. 
 
We argue that the robustness of DABIT against geometric attacks 
targeting the watermark detection mechanism is relatively strong. This 
is due to the rigorous relationship between the original data stream and 
the watermarked version in terms of both time stamps and the order of 
data points. Hence, in case time stamps were tampered with in a 
geometric attack, a more advanced watermark detection mechanism 
may still recognize the order of data points as a reference to where the 
watermark is embedded. Altering the order of data points will increase 
the difficulty of watermark detection, but this operation is considered 
to result in a higher quality loss compared to other attack strategies. 
 
Given that the unwatermarked data stream is not known and the value 
of the least significant digit is unpredictable, the DABIT watermark is 
arguably invisible to a malicious agent. However, the technique is 
potentially vulnerable to cryptographic and subsequent protocol 
attacks if different agents buy the same data stream with the purpose 
of averaging them or otherwise compare each data point to detect and 




watermarking methods. A certain level of protection against such 
attacks can be achieved by utilizing strategic watermarks, but the actual 
composition of the watermark lies outside the scope of this study. 
 
Lastly, removal attacks are seemingly the most relevant threat against 
DABIT because this approach can be conducted in a similar manner to 
the watermark implementation and product versioning itself. Thus, this 
mode of attack is in line with our assumption of minor noise in data 
points generally resulting in the lowest perceived quality reduction of 
IIoT data streams. We will not consider removal attacks such as 
averaging adjacent data points, which would harm the update  
frequency, nor the complete removal of selected data points, which 
would not be a viable approach for attacking an invisible watermark. 
Instead, we identify relevant removal attacks as being rounding, 
truncation or adding noise to the data stream. Common for these three 
removal attacks is their aim to reduce the quality of the data stream in 
an unbiased manner while maintaining other quality attributes such as 
frequency and time stamps. To simplify the assessment of these attacks, 
we combine these three attack modes in a common operation of 
reducing precision with rounding. We allow for this simplification 
because the least significant digit of a DABIT watermarked data stream 
will be equally distorted regardless of whether rounding, truncation or 





One of the key features of DABIT that helps withstanding the 
aforementioned removal attacks is that even if the rounding operation 
is only applied to the least significant digit, the embedded watermark 
will occasionally affect more significant digits. Given a uniform 
distribution of least significant digits between 0–9, every 100th rounding 
operation is expected to impact the second least significant digit. Every 
1,000th rounding operation will impact the third least significant digit 
and so on. This effect makes the watermark fairly robust against attacks 
on less significant digits, but it also illustrates the exponentially 
increasing difficulty to recover the watermark for every decimal being 
attacked by a malicious agent. 
 
3.3 Economic Reasoning 
The economic motivation behind applying digital watermarking is to 
embed provenance in IIoT data streams. The ability to recover this 
watermark at a later point is an important tool to fight malicious agents 
in the marketplace, as well as providing true consumers with a method 
for verifying authenticity of their data stream.  
 
The perceived risk associated with illicit redistribution of IIoT data 
streams increases significantly when knowing that a data stream 
includes traceability back to its initial buyer. In this situation, malicious 
agents attempting to illicitly redistribute a data stream face two options: 




stream; or to attack the watermark in an attempt to remove the traces 
leading back to them. The first option is not considered to be rational 
due to the portable nature of data streams. Therefore, we will focus on 
the direct and indirect costs of attacking the watermark in our analysis. 
 
Lastly, product versioning will also help prevent illicit redistribution of 
data streams in secondary markets. Offering the original data stream at 
a lower price and precision level will eliminate some incentives for 
malicious agents attempting to resell attacked, lower-priced versions 
because they must compete with authentic substitutes. Such authentic, 
lower-priced versions target consumers that are not willing to pay for 
the higher-priced options while also supporting the market price 
through product differentiation. 
 
3.3.1 The Quality Gap 
With the introduced quality discriminating approach, it becomes 
essential to identify the optimal quality gap between two product 
versions, as illustrated in Figure 4. In this chapter, we will explain how 






Figure 4 – The quality gap in product versioning 
 
Figure 4 also illustrates the general assumption of consumers’ 
willingness to pay for quality. Consumers requiring high quality will 
prefer the higher-priced option while consumers with less interest in 
data precision will resort to the lower-priced option or an attacked 
version of this in the secondary market. Therefore, the market price 
difference can express utility as a function of quality. The reason why 
we do not suggest additional levels of quality is that any levels of quality 
lower than version B would not be able to compete with attacked 
versions of A, which would have higher quality in the secondary market. 
 
In terms of identifying the optimal quality gap, we argue that it pays off 
for the data owner to pursue watermark reconstruction of illegally 
distributed data streams until the costs of these efforts increase 









watermark attacks. This is because any costs of pursuing malicious 
agents that exceed consumers’ combined willingness to pay for the 
quality difference between the true and the illicit good cannot be 
expected to be recovered. When these two cost functions are in 
equilibrium, the property rights holder is indifferent between pursuing 
malicious agents through watermark reconstruction and offering an 
authentic substitute of the illicit good on the marketplace, hence 
version B in Figure 4. This authentic good can match the precision level 
of illicit goods and still provide greater value due to its authenticity. 
 
3.3.2 Cost of Watermarking (CoW) 
We define cost of watermarking to consist of two main factors: 
embedding and reconstruction costs. These costs are faced by the 
property rights holder. Embedding is the cost of implementing the 
watermark through a rounding operation, which we define as a linear 
cost function expressed by a cost parameter ρ and the number of 
rounding operations x per data point.  
 
Reconstruction costs are expressed as an exponential function of cost 
parameter a and the number of digits x that have been attacked by a 
malicious agent – in other words, the number of rounding operations 
applied per data point by the attacker. The exponential property is 




available and collected in order to detect traces of the watermark for 
every digit of precision that has been attacked. 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑊	 = 	𝜌	𝑥	 × 	𝑎	105 
 
where: 
x is the number of digits processed 
ρ is the per digit cost of watermarking (rounding) operation 
a is the per data point cost of watermark reconstruction 
 
3.3.3 Cost of Attacking (CoA) 
Malicious agents are facing two main factors in their cost function: the 
actual attack operation; and the resulting loss of value of the data 
stream due to the reduced quality. 
 
Costs associated with performing the attack are considered to be 
equivalent to the initial watermark embedding process because we 
assume this to be performed as a rounding operation that reduces the 
precision level of the data stream. The cost of quality reduction is the 
consumer-perceived loss of quality of the data stream caused by an 
attack of the watermark. Due to the invisibility of the watermark, the 
attack is assumed to obscure or remove one digit per level of strength, 
x. According to our general assumption of a linear utility function of 





𝐶𝑜𝐴	 = 	𝜌	𝑥	 × 	𝑏	𝑥 
 
where: 
x is the number of digits processed 
ρ is the per digit cost of attacking (rounding) operation 





4 Analytical Analysis 
4.1 Equilibrium Between CoW and CoA 
To identify the optimal quality gap and thus versioning strategy for the 
described scenario, we determine the equilibrium between the cost of 
watermarking and the cost of attacking. This equilibrium will identify 
the quality level at which product version B should be introduced to 
support the market value of product version A. The graph below 
indicates where this equilibrium can be found. The x-axis expresses the 
number of digits attacked by malicious agents in order to remove the 
watermark and thus the number of digits that drive the cost of the 
watermark reconstruction process. The cost of attack (CoA) increases 
linearly with the wasted quality and associated loss of consumers’ 
willingness to pay per attacked digit. The cost of watermarking (CoW), 
which is largely driven by the reconstruction of watermarks in pursuit 
of malicious agents, increases exponentially with the number of 
attacked digits due to the nature of the watermark technique as 
described for its robustness properties. As argued in our economic 
reasoning, these two cost functions are equal at the optimal “quality 






As illustrated in Figure 5, one equilibrium can occur before there is a 
full-digit “quality gap”, thus when no DABIT watermark should be added. 
A second equilibrium between the two cost functions CoW and CoA can 
occur at a greater optimal “quality gap” between product version A and 
B.  
 
The following equation expresses all equilibria between the two cost 
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𝐶𝑜𝑊	 = 	𝐶𝑜𝐴 
 
𝜌	𝑥	 × 	𝑎	105 	= 	𝜌	𝑥	 × 	𝑏	𝑥 
 
As we assume the costs of rounding operations for the property holder 
and the malicious agent to be the same, these two factors cancel each 
other out and we are left with the costs of pursuing reconstruction of 
watermarks in attacked primary products, and the perceived loss of 
value due to reduced quality from watermark attacks: 
 
𝑎	105 	= 	𝑏	𝑥 
 
4.2 Determining the Optimal Quality Gap 
The resulting function y below describes the ideal ratio between cost 
parameters a and b at different quality gaps x between product versions 








If the cost parameters are known, the optimal quality gap between the 
two product versions can be determined with the quality gap curve 






Figure 6 – The quality gap curve 
 
We can see from the quality gap curve that the cost ratio y must be 
lower than 0.1 for the ideal quality gap to be higher than one digit. This 
is discovered by tracing a horizontal line from any given cost ratio y and 
observe for which values of x the line intersects with the quality gap 
curve. Below is an example of how the ideal quality gap is located if the 






105 = 0.02 
 
where 
a is the per data point cost of watermark reconstruction 
b is the perceived loss of value per reduced precision level 
x is the quality gap between product versions A and B 
 










Figure 7 – Practical use of the quality gap curve 
 
The quality gap curve illustrates the two equilibria between cost 
functions CoW and CoA, but we ignore the equilibrium occurring at less 
than a one-digit optimal quality gap between product versions. The 
second optimal quality gap for the suggested cost ratio occurs at 
approximately x = 2, hence at a two-digit quality gap. 
 
4.3 Applicability of the Quality Gap Function 
To further investigate the applicability of the quality gap function for 
the scenario covered by this study, we calculate the first derivative of y 
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y = 0.02 







ln(10) 	 ∙ 	𝑥
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ln(10) 	 ∙ 	𝑥	 − 	1
105 	 
 




ln(10) 	 ∙ 	𝑥	 − 	1
105 = 	0 
𝑥	 = 	
1
ln(10) 	≈ 	0.43 
 
From Figure 6 as well as the mathematical properties of the quality gap 
function, we see that x ≈ 0.43 is a global maximum. Thus, the quality 
gap function is applicable for cost factor ratios in the interval (0, 0.43]. 
We also appreciate that the limit of the quality gap function y as x 
approaches infinity is 0. In other words, as consumers’ willingness to 
pay for precision (b) grows relatively larger than the per data point cost 
of watermark reconstruction (a), the ideal quality gap approaches 
infinity. That said, the actual quality gap is practically limited by the 









There is little doubt that the use-cases for shared data streams are 
many and that the resulting advancements in operational efficiency and 
productivity are likely to be in the public interest. However, it seems like 
our private interests and lack of trust are currently preventing us from 
taking full advantage of this opportunity. It is natural to assume that our 
past experience with digital media piracy may be a decisive factor in this 
regard. This is why we proclaim that digital rights management models 
have become more relevant than ever before. 
 
5.1 Summary 
Our economic analysis shows how a simple technique for implementing 
provenance through digital watermarking in data streams can create a 
basis for more commercially viable IIoT data marketplaces. The key 
takeaway of this study is the relationship between perceived value of 
data streams and the efforts associated with enforcing property rights, 




The combined property rights enforcement and pricing model shows 
that there is in fact an equilibrium on the quality scale between these 




versioning strategy. However, this equilibrium may not exist for all 
watermarking techniques and is dependent upon the cost functions of 
embedding and reconstruction of watermarks. This emphasizes that 
there might be more considerations to be made when assessing 
watermarking techniques for IIoT data streams than just technological 
features alone. 
 
Although the practical use-cases of this model will require further 
research and more rigorous testing, we have answered our research 
question and shown how digital watermarking and product versioning 
can contribute to economically viable IIoT data trading. The proposed 
model can also increase trust and ensure data owners a greater part of 
the revenue stream from their data despite the presence of malicious 
agents in the marketplace. 
 
Moreover, we believe an online data stream authentication service can 
provide additional value to the proposed digital rights management 
model. We have mainly focused on the use of watermarks to legally 
pursue malicious agents when illicit data streams are discovered in 
secondary markets, but another relevant value-proposition is for 
consumers who would like to verify the authenticity and quality level of 






6 Limitations and Future Research 
As a complete digital watermarking mechanism requires more 
sophisticated functionality, which lies outside the scope of this study, 
the main purpose of the described technology is to illustrate how 
property enforcement can be combined with pricing strategies in the 
pursuit of economically viable IIoT data sharing.  
 
As for the quality gap function, we assume that the willingness to pay 
for quality is known in order to identify the ideal product versioning 
strategy. However, due to the wide spectrum of use-cases for data, it 
can be a challenging task to reveal the consumer’s willingness to pay. 
 
Moreover, the watermarking technique DABIT features some obvious 
shortcomings in that it requires a minimum quality loss of one-digit 
precision in order to be implemented, and each data point must carry 
more digits than the optimal quality gap. Moreover, all watermarked 
data points need to be kept for reference for watermark detection, and 
the technique is not robust against time stamp manipulation, 
aggregation, and the averaging of multiple data streams. Lastly, DABIT 
requires careful consideration during distribution in order for data 
streams that are adjacent in quality to not reveal in which data points 





Although we argue that DABIT addresses shortcomings of alternative 
watermarking techniques, a common denominator for this study and 
prior works is the general approach and lack of specific use-cases. Thus, 
future research should attempt to combine successful features of 
existing models into novel watermarking frameworks designed for 
more specific scenarios that are relevant for IIoT data sharing. Such 
frameworks should also be considered and compared in combination 
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초    록 
 
 
산업용 사물 인터넷 (IIoT) 데이터가 제품과 서비스를 위한 중요한 
고급 데이터 소스로 여겨지고 있지만, 여전히 수 많은 기업들은 
불충분한 산업용 사물 인터넷 데이터 공유 시스템으로 인하여 
고충을 겪고 있다. 방대한 분량의 산업용 데이터가 제대로 거래되지 
못하고 있으며, 이는 데이터의 커다란 가치 손실로 이어지고 있다. 
본 연구에서는 서비스로서의 센싱 (Sensing as a Service) 비지니스 
모델이 한정적으로 적용되고 있는 원인이 해당 정보의 경제적, 
기술적 특징들을 반영하는 디지털 권리 시스템의 부재에 
기인한다고 보고 있다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 산업용 사물 인터넷  
데이터에 대한 지적재산권 집행 시스템과 데이터 가격산정 모델을 
제안하여 산업용 사물 인터넷 데이터 공유 인센티브 문제를 
해결하고자 한다.  
 
주요어 : 4 차산업혁명, 산업용 사물인터넷, 서비스로서의 센싱, 
산업용 사물인터넷 데이터 거래, 디지털 권리 관리, 디지털 
워터마크 
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